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India is hosting the BRICS summit at a particularly complicated moment in the global context. The grouping has grown substantially since its original five members, bringing together countries that account for a large share of the world’s population and economy, with Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates also a part of it. And that is where the problem lies because each of these countries have their own geopolitical interests, making it a tricky balancing act for India.
It is not that India has to choose between BRICS and the West. The issue is that some of the key countries in BRICS are on different sides of the current geopolitical disputes.
A clear example is China. Its economic might gives the BRICS a significant part of its global weight and considering the fact that China is one of India’s biggest trade partners, cooperation between New Delhi and Beijing will be necessary if BRICS is to have a serious role in discussions on global trade and cooperation.
But, India itself is a powerful nation that’s steadily emerging as the voice of the Global South. Right from the time of the non-aligned movement, India has steadily been neutral in major geopolitical conflicts. So it is critical for India to not let BRICS become an extension of Chinese foreign policy.
The two countries remain strategic competitors, especially after years of tensions along their disputed border. Even as Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping seek to stabilise bilateral ties, it is important for New Delhi to not allow Beijing to position itself as the natural leader of the developing world.
This is one reason India’s outreach to other large developing countries matters. Brazil and South Africa give BRICS greater representation across Latin America and Africa, while Indonesia brings in another major Asian power. Countries such as Egypt and Nigeria also broaden India’s ability to argue that BRICS is not simply a platform for China and Russia.
Russia is a different game altogether. New Delhi and Moscow are major strategic partners in energy and defence and it is critical for India to maintain the equation. However, Russia views BRICS as a part of its wider effort to challenge the West.
India has always been neutral, consistently arguing for a more inclusive global order with greater representation for developing countries in institutions such as UN and other global bodies. With China and Russia both in play and with their respective relations with the USA, it is up to India to not let an anti-US alliance come into the picture here.
That distinction becomes particularly important on issues such as de-dollarisation. India has an interest in making trade between developing countries easier and increasing the use of national currencies. But it has been much more cautious than some other BRICS members about turning this into a project to replace the dollar or build an explicitly alternative financial order.
However, the most immediate complication is Iran. While Iran joined BRICS in 2024, New Delhi and Tehran have been strategically linked for a long time with India’s interests like the Chabahar Port. New Delhi also wants to maintain its ability to engage with Iran at a time when the wider Middle East is becoming increasingly unstable.
With the ongoing war where Iran is at the centre of a conflict with implications beyond its geographic borders, this is more than just a diplomatic question for India. Considering how energy supplies and shipping are linked through the Strait of Hormuz, any prolonged disruption to the supply-chain in the region has direct consequences for India.
Now another twist in this tale is the fact that Iran is attacking USA interests located in UAE and Saudi Arabia, both of which are members of BRICS. So India now has to maintain its relationship with both the Gulf countries and Iran, without impacting anything else.
This is perhaps where the idea of India as a bridge becomes more than diplomatic rhetoric. While India may not necessarily be in a position to try and solve the Middle East crisis just as it isn’t India’s role to resolve the strategic competition between China and USA or Russia-West confrontation, what India needs to do and can do is to keep these disagreements from adversely affecting BRICS.
India’s official agenda for its 2026 BRICS presidency, perhaps, is reflective of this. This year’s theme is “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability (Humanity First)”. Which means India will most likely strive to push the grouping towards cooperation regarding finance, energy security, supply chains, technology sharing, climate, and other reformative activities.
This is where the success of the summit will ultimately be judged. The question is not whether India can get China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Brazil, South Africa and the other BRICS members to agree on the major conflicts dividing them. They plainly do not.
The more realistic question is whether India can keep them cooperating despite those differences.
If BRICS becomes primarily a vehicle for China’s and Russia’s challenge to the West, India’s ability to position itself as an independent voice will be constrained. If, instead, New Delhi can keep the grouping focused on the economic and political concerns shared by developing countries, it has a stronger case for playing the role it wants: a country capable of talking to competing powers and finding enough common ground to keep them at the same table.
