Why the Yemeni Houthi capture of a tiny island matters to India

Yemeni Houthis’ captured of Perim Island on September 11, in the middle of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Perim sits between Yemen and Djibouti/Eritrea and is the main path connecting the Mediterranean sea with the Red Sea and subsequently the Arabian sea. This is more significant than just a territory changing hands.

The Houthis have also taken the nearby Yemeni coastal town of Dhubab, giving them positions on both sides of the approach. They have not “closed” the strait, but control of Perim could give them a stronger ability to control ships using one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.

The Bab el-Mandeb connects the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and then the Suez Canal. This is the shortest maritime route between Asia and Europe. Around 12% of global trade normally moves through Suez, according to ICRA, while the route is particularly important for container shipping and energy cargoes. If ships decide the Bab el-Mandeb is too dangerous, they don’t necessarily stop sailing; they divert around the Cape of Good Hope. But that adds roughly two weeks to the journey, while pushing up fuel, insurance and freight costs.

Why it matters to India?

For India, this matters because the Suez route is a major connection to its western markets. ICRA says India uses the Suez route for trade with Europe, North Africa, North America and South America, together accounting for more than 35% of India’s total foreign trade. That number needs to be interpreted carefully: it does not mean 35% of all Indian trade physically passes through Suez. It means more than 35% of India’s foreign trade is with markets for which the Suez route is used. The Indian government’s Department of Economic Affairs gives another striking measure: 80% of India’s merchandise trade with Europe passes through the Red Sea, exposing products including chemicals, textiles, steel, automobiles and auto components to disruption.

Does it mean India’s trade to the west will stop?

So if Bab el-Mandeb were effectively blocked, India would not suddenly lose 35% of its trade. Ships can still go around Africa. The problem is cost and time. Longer voyages mean higher freight and insurance bills, delayed deliveries and more working capital tied up in goods at sea. Indian exporters could become less competitive in European markets, while importers could face higher landed costs. And because India is a major oil importer, a broader disruption to energy shipping could add another layer of pressure through higher crude and freight prices. The current crisis is already pushing global oil prices above $100 a barrel amid disruptions around both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.

What has Indian Navy been doing in the region?

This is also why India’s naval activity in the region is worth watching. India has had a continuous anti-piracy presence in the Gulf of Aden since 2008, but the 2023-24 Houthi attacks significantly expanded the mission. In December 2023, the Navy increased deployments of destroyers and frigates and expanded maritime surveillance across the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden. During the first 100 days of the enhanced operation in 2024, the Navy responded to 18 incidents; over the following year, it said it deployed more than 30 ships and responded to more than 25 incidents, saving more than 400 lives.

What’s particularly interesting is what India has been doing in 2026. In July, INS Trikand, already mission-deployed in the Gulf of Aden, responded to a piracy attempt on the merchant ship Golden Arsenal, with the Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region coordinating the response. Then, in August, INS Trishul and INS Aditya escorted two crude-oil tankers through the Bab el-Mandeb, including an Indian-flagged vessel headed for Mumbai and another headed towards Suez. Indian naval units have also continued monitoring merchant traffic through the strait.

That makes the timing around Perim particularly interesting. India already has warships, maritime patrol aircraft and a maritime-information network operating around the approaches to Bab el-Mandeb.

Saturday morning, Marine Traffic tracking data also showed an Indian Naval warship (most likely INS Trishul) in the Red Sea, near the territory. The basis for saying it is most likely INS Trishul is an X post by Indian Navy which stated that the ship was in Djibouti for “professional exchanges with Djibouti Coast Guard”.

The Navy’s role has officially been maritime security, anti-piracy, surveillance and protection of merchant shipping not offensive action against the Houthis. So it would not be correct to say India is preparing for a military confrontation. India is not in a state of war with any country neither are there any indications of any upcoming conflict. But if the Houthis now try to turn their territorial gains into an actual blockade, India’s existing presence suddenly becomes much more strategically important.

The key question is no longer simply whether India can protect individual ships; it is whether India, alongside other navies, can help preserve freedom of navigation through a chokepoint that connects a significant portion of India’s western trade to the global economy.